Key Players

Ordered the incineration of all seized property on March 20, 2000 — seven days before charges were filed — destroying the only physical evidence in the case. No laboratory testing, no photographs, no preserved samples. The destruction eliminated any possibility of independent verification and was the direct cause of the Brady violation that followed.

Presented a self-generated, unverified list of suspected chemicals to the federal grand jury as if the physical evidence still existed. No disclosure was made that the property had been incinerated prior to the federal complaint.

Transferred a state case with no surviving evidence into the federal system between March 20 and March 27, 2000, and presented that destroyed evidence to a federal grand jury as if it were intact.

Participated in the August 24, 2000 off-docket pretrial hearing — a scheduled court proceeding deliberately kept off the public record to shield every participant from the Brady violations being hosted on the court's own time and the taxpayers' money. Myers was present. Stone's participation in that proceeding, under color of his dual law enforcement authority, constituted the coordinated deprivation of Myers' Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights.

Advanced a federal prosecution while in possession of knowledge — or with deliberate ignorance — that the primary physical evidence had been destroyed before charges were filed. The Brady obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence is absolute. Norwood's failure to disclose the evidence destruction was not an oversight; it was the foundation of the prosecution.

Participated in the August 24, 2000 off-docket pretrial hearing — a scheduled court proceeding conducted on the court's time and the taxpayers' money, deliberately kept off the public record to protect every participant from the Brady violations already committed. Myers was present. Norwood's participation in that proceeding, alongside the judge, detective, defense counsel, and court clerk, was a coordinated effort to suppress Myers' constitutional motions from the public record and prevent them from reaching a ruling on the merits.

As an AUSA acting under color of federal authority, Norwood participated in the suppression of Myers' Brady and Speedy Trial rights in a private, un-docketed conference. The result was Myers' continued detention beyond the lawful Speedy Trial deadline without a valid court order.

Myers has filed a formal report with the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility documenting Norwood's conduct. DOJ OPR has jurisdiction over the professional conduct of all DOJ attorneys, including AUSAs. The report documents Norwood's participation in the chambers conference and his role in suppressing Myers' motions from the public record.

Failed to enter a valid, docketed continuance order before the 70-day Speedy Trial clock expired on September 5, 2000. The absence of a timely, valid order on the public docket meant Myers was held in pretrial detention without legal authority from September 5 through September 11, 2000 — a period of six days of illegal detention.

Convened and presided over the August 24, 2000 off-docket pretrial hearing — a scheduled court proceeding conducted on the court's time and the taxpayers' money, deliberately kept off the public record to protect every participant from the Brady violations already committed. Myers was present. Gilbert personally scolded him for filing his constitutional motions, then ensured all three were buried without ever entering the official record. This was not a judicial act. It was a federal judge using his courtroom and his authority to host a cover-up.

Acting under color of his judicial authority, Gilbert permitted Myers to be held in pretrial detention for six days beyond the lawful Speedy Trial deadline, suppressed Myers' constitutional motions from the public record, and permitted the post-facto falsification of the court docket to conceal the violation. Judicial immunity does not extend to acts taken outside the judicial function — including administrative conspiracy and the deliberate suppression of a defendant's constitutional rights.

The conduct documented in this case — participation in an off-the-record conference to suppress a defendant's motions, failure to enter a valid Speedy Trial order, and permitting the post-facto falsification of the official docket — constitutes conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. A formal complaint under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act may be filed with the Seventh Circuit Judicial Council.

On September 11, 2000, Duncan manually entered Document 25 into the CM/ECF electronic registry using a backdated entry of September 5, 2000 — six days after the fact. She used a fictional 'Final Pretrial Hearing' event code to bypass the system's automated locks. The electronic network metadata, which cannot be altered, records the true entry date as September 11, 2000. The paper record she created says otherwise. She created both.

The falsification of Document 25 was executed for the specific purpose of concealing the Speedy Trial default and the six-day illegal detention of Michael Ray Myers. The act was designed to make the official court record reflect a lawful proceeding that did not occur, thereby obstructing any future review of Myers' constitutional claims.

Duncan participated in the August 24, 2000 off-docket pretrial hearing — a scheduled court proceeding deliberately kept off the public record to shield every participant from the Brady violations being hosted on the court's own time. Her subsequent execution of the registry manipulation on September 11, 2000 was the operational conclusion of that cover-up — the act that converted the off-docket agreement into a falsified public record.

Acting under color of her authority as a federal court officer, Duncan falsified the official court record to conceal the deprivation of Myers' Speedy Trial rights and his six-day illegal detention. The falsification directly prevented Myers from obtaining relief on his constitutional claims for 26 years.

Fraud upon the court — defined as conduct by an officer of the court that is directed at the judicial machinery itself, is intentionally false, and corrupts the judicial process — carries no statute of limitations. Duncan's falsification of Document 25 meets every element of this doctrine. The claim is not time-barred. It may be raised at any time.

Participated in the August 24, 2000 off-docket pretrial hearing — a scheduled court proceeding conducted on the court's time and the taxpayers' money, deliberately kept off the public record to protect every participant from the Brady violations already committed. Myers was present. Defense counsel's presence at a proceeding designed to suppress his own client's constitutional motions is not a protected legal act. It is participation in a cover-up conducted against the client and against the court.

Stegmeyer's participation in a private conference to suppress his own client's Brady and Speedy Trial motions constitutes a direct conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, and misrepresentation under Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. An Illinois State Bar disciplinary complaint may be filed on this basis.

Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant is entitled to counsel whose performance meets an objective standard of reasonableness. Stegmeyer's participation in the suppression of Myers' own constitutional motions — in a private conference with the opposing party and the presiding judge — falls below any objective standard of reasonableness. The prejudice prong is satisfied by Myers' continued detention and ultimate conviction on a record that should have been dismissed.